Beyond the Headline: Persistent Food Inflation in Rural and Urban Malawi Despite Recent Declines, 2025–2026
Posted: November 18, 2026 Posted By: Dr. Innocent Pangapanga
Innocent PANGAPANGA-PHIRI, Center for Agricultural Research and Development (CARD) , Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Bunda College of Agriculture, Lilongwe. Corresponding: ipangapanga@luanar.ac.mw
Key Messages
• Net food buyers pay at a higher price: Persistent food inflation means that farmers who sold maize at or near the farmgate price after harvest must now buy it back at a 22% higher price during the lean season, while traders who bought at harvest gain from the difference.
• Rural households face the highest food inflation. Rural food inflation (13.7%) has been above urban (10.9%) since February 2026, reversing the pattern of October 2025 (31.8% rural, 33.7% urban).
• Food inflation has stopped falling. Annual food inflation eased from 14.3% in July to 12.5% in September 2026, then rose to 12.8% in October. Food prices increased every month over the period, by 2.0% in October alone.
• Non-food costs are now the main source of inflation. Non-food inflation rose from 23.8% in October 2025 to 28.7% in October 2026, driven by transport (35.6%) and housing, water and electricity (33.4%), both tied to fuel and energy costs.
• The lean season is adding pressure. Food prices are now 8.8% above their June 2026 level. Poor households in the southern districts need protection now.
• The 2026/27 agricultural season is at risk. Rising costs of imported agricultural inputs and persistent fuel shortages may force farmers to reduce fertilizer application rates, delay mechanized land preparation, and plant late. Coupled with the anticipated 2026/27 El Niño, these constraints could exacerbate production shortfalls, intensifying inflationary pressures in 2027.
1. Introduction
The National Statistical Office (NSO) released the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for October 2026 on November 15, 2026. The CPI tracks the prices of a fixed basket of goods and services that households commonly buy, and the inflation rate shows how fast those prices are rising. NSO publishes separate indices for the whole country, urban areas, and rural areas. Food is the largest item in every basket. It makes up 53.7% of household spending nationally, 45.3% in urban areas and 58.1% in rural areas (NSO, 2026). Monitoring inflation is important for both national and household planning. At the national level, the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) uses inflation data to set its policy interest rate (RBM, 2026). Government also needs inflation figures to plan its budget, because the cost of public wages, social cash transfers, farm input subsidies and strategic grain reserves all rise when prices rise. At the household level, inflation determines how much an income can buy. This brief compares price changes between 2025 and 2026, focusing on October 2025 versus October 2026, and explains what has changed, why it has changed, what this means for rural and urban households and the coming farming season, and what can be done to keep inflation falling.
3. Findings and Discussion
3.1 National picture: a food-led slowdown
Annual (year-on-year [YoY]) inflation compares prices in a given month with prices in the same month one year earlier. On this measure, inflation was lower in every month of 2026 than in the same month of 2025. The difference grew over the year, from 3.6 percentage points in January (24.9% compared with 28.5%) to 10.5 percentage points in October (18.6% compared with 29.1%).
Food was the main reason for this improvement. In 2025, food inflation stayed between 31.6% and 38.5% every month. In 2026, it was much lower, between 12.5% and 22.1%. Non-food inflation moved in the opposite direction and stayed above 28% throughout 2026 (NSO, 2026). As a result, food now accounts for a much smaller share of overall inflation. In October 2025, food accounted for 20.1 of the 29.1 percentage points of inflation (69%). By October 2026, it accounted for 8.2 of the 18.6 percentage points (44%), as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Inflation by area, October 2025 and October 2026.
October National 2025 National 2026 Urban 2025 Urban 2026 Rural 2025 Rural 2026
Headline (YoY, %) 29.1 18.6 28.1 17.6 29.6 19.1
Food (YoY, %) 32.4 12.8 33.7 10.9 31.8 13.7
Non-food (YoY, %) 23.8 28.7 20.9 27.2 25.6 29.7
3.2 Rural and urban food inflation: the gap has reversed
Food inflation has declined in both rural and urban areas, although the rate of decline has differed between the two, as shown in Figure 1 (NSO, 2026). This trend partly suggests that government interventions to stabilize food prices and manage inflation may be having a positive effect, although other market and seasonal factors could also be contributing to the observed changes. In October 2025, urban food inflation (33.7%) was higher than rural food inflation (31.8%). From February 2026 onwards, rural food inflation has stayed above urban food inflation. Urban food inflation fell to its lowest point of 9.7% in August 2026 and has since risen slightly to 10.9%. Rural food inflation has fallen more slowly and remained at 13.7% in both September and October. This gap matters because rural households spend a larger share of their budget on food (58.1%) than urban households (45.3%). Food therefore adds 9.0 percentage points to rural inflation but only 6.4 points to urban inflation. This is one reason why overall inflation is now higher in rural areas (19.1%) than in urban areas (17.6%).
Source: NSO CPI Stats Flash, October 2026 (Year-on-Year); Urban and rural food inflation, Oct 2025–Oct 2026
3.3 Monthly price changes: food prices are rising again
A lower annual inflation rate does not mean that food has become cheaper. It only means that prices are rising more slowly than before. Monthly figures, which compare prices with the previous month, show that food prices fell sharply in April 2026 (by 5.6%) when the new harvest reached the markets. Since July, however, food prices have risen every month, and in October they were 8.8% higher than in June. In urban areas, monthly food inflation in October 2026 (2.3%) was higher than in October 2025 (1.3%). This is an early warning that the annual food inflation rate may stop falling, or even rise, during the lean season from November to March.
3.4 Maize prices: market prices are above the farmgate price
A LUANAR-CARD Community Market Survey in twelve districts shows the same upward pressure on maize, the main staple food (Figure 2). In November 2026, maize sold for an average of K1,100 per kg. This is K200, or 22%, above the minimum farmgate price of K900 per kg in April 2026. The gap means that farmers who sold maize at or near the farmgate price after harvest must now buy it back at a higher price during the lean season, while traders who bought at harvest gain from the difference. IFPRI's national price monitoring confirms this pattern. During the 2026 harvest, maize traded well below the government-mandated minimum farmgate price of K900/kg (IFPRI, 2026b). By October, retail prices had risen by 7%, from an average of K1,001/kg to K1,072/kg, and were above K900/kg in all monitored markets except five of the six in the Northern Region.
Source: LUANAR-CARD Community Market Survey, November 2026, in Chitipa, Karonga, Rumphi, Nkhata Bay, Mzimba, Dowa, Zomba, Machinga, Balaka, Mulanje, Phalombe and Chiradzulu; IFPRI (2026a), average retail prices for the week ending 28 October 2026.
4. Drivers of the Changes
Better maize harvest and base effects. Good rains during the 2025/26 season produced an average national maize harvest in 2026. As new maize reached the markets, prices at Mitundu, the national reference market, fell by about 20% between April and May 2026 (FEWS NET, 2026). The fall in annual food inflation also reflects a "base effect": food prices had already risen by 32.4% in the year to October 2025, so this year's prices are being compared with a very high starting point. However, maize remained expensive. Even after the harvest, prices were still about 40% above the five-year average (FEWS NET, 2026). Informal imports from Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania have since helped limit price increases, as cheap imported maize kept domestic prices close to import-parity levels (IFPRI, 2026a).
Fuel scarcity and energy costs. Fuel is a major driver of non-food inflation. The transport price index rose by about 15% in a single month, between March and April 2026, following the fuel price increase of 1 April. Higher prices for charcoal and firewood also pushed up the cost of housing, water, and electricity (NSO, 2026). High fuel prices and shortages are expected to continue until at least January 2027 (FEWS NET, 2026). The current scarcity of petrol and diesel raises costs beyond the official pump price. Transporters spend time in fuel queues or buy fuel at higher prices on the parallel market, and they pass these extra costs on to passengers and traders through higher fares and freight charges. These costs affect food prices in several ways. It becomes more expensive to move maize from surplus areas in the Central and Northern regions to deficit markets in the Southern Region. Some rural maize mills run on diesel, so milling costs rise and maize flour prices increase faster than grain prices. Perishable foods such as vegetables, fish, and fruit can spoil when deliveries are delayed, reducing supply and raising prices. For non-food items, fuel scarcity raises minibus fares and the cost of distributing manufactured and imported goods such as soap, cooking oil and clothing. Rural markets, which are furthest from fuel depots, are usually hit hardest.
Foreign exchange shortages and fiscal pressure. Malawi does not have enough foreign currency to pay for all the imports it needs. On the parallel (informal) market, foreign currency costs about 140% more than at the official rate. Meanwhile, the Malawi kwacha is trading around MK4,000 per US dollar on the parallel market, compared with the official exchange rate of MK1,751 per US dollar. This makes imported fuel, medicines and farm inputs more expensive and harder to obtain (FEWS NET, 2026). The World Bank also notes that public debt is above 90% of GDP and that the government runs large budget deficits (World Bank, 2026). Heavy government borrowing to cover these deficits keeps pressure on prices upward.
Monetary policy and the lean season. In October 2026, the RBM kept its policy rate at 24% and took steps to tighten liquidity in the banking system. It noted that inflation is still far above its target (RBM, 2026). At the same time, the lean season has started. We expect maize prices to rise between October 2026 and January 2027 and to remain about 65% above the five-year average (FEWS NET, 2026).
5. Implications for Household Welfare
• Household purchasing power continues to fall. Because prices are still rising, money buys less each month. A basket of goods that cost K10,000 in October 2025 now costs about K11,860. A basket of food that cost K10,000 in December 2021 now costs about K34,500. Wages and farm incomes have not risen at the same pace, so most households can afford less than before. Poor households suffer most because they spend the largest share of their income on food.
• Rural households are the most exposed. Rural households now face the highest food inflation of the three CPI series (13.7%). They also face fast-rising costs for other essentials, including housing and fuelwood (35.8%), clothing and footwear (38.9%), and health (24.9%) (NSO, 2026). During the lean season, many rural families run out of food from their own harvest and must buy maize at rising prices. FEWS NET expects Crisis conditions, where households face food gaps or can meet minimum needs only by selling assets in several southern districts, including Chikwawa, Nsanje and Balaka. It estimates that 1.5 to 1.99 million people will need humanitarian food assistance up to January 2027 (FEWS NET, 2026).
• Urban households face rising non-food costs. Urban food inflation is lower than in rural areas, but it is rising again: food prices in towns and cities increased by 2.3% in October alone, the fastest monthly increase of the three series. Urban transport costs are 48.2% higher than a year ago, and housing, water and electricity costs are 29.5% higher (NSO, 2026). FEWS NET expects most urban households to meet their minimum food needs but to struggle to pay for housing, transport, utilities and school fees. Fewer casual jobs are available, adding pressure on low-income workers (FEWS NET, 2026).
6. Implications for the 2026/27 Agricultural Season
The 2026/27 farming season is starting as the rains arrive in November and December. The price pressures described above could affect how much farmers plant and harvest, and therefore food prices in 2027.
• Higher cost of farm inputs: most fertilizer, seed and agrochemicals are imported. Because of foreign exchange shortages, these inputs are already scarce and expensive (FEWS NET, 2026).
• Fuel scarcity constrained diesel-powered irrigation and mechanized farming operations: petrol and diesel shortages delay the delivery of fertilizer and seed to rural depots and input programmes. They also limit diesel-pumped irrigation and tractor hire for land preparation, which can delay planting.
• Less fertilizer and late planting likely reduced agricultural production: when input and transport costs rise faster than farm incomes, many smallholder farmers buy less fertilizer or plant later than they should. Borrowing to buy inputs is also expensive, with the policy rate at 24% (RBM, 2026). Both lower fertilizer use and late planting reduce crop yields.
• Labour and cash shortages: during the lean season, poor households often work on other people's farms for food or cash instead of preparing their own fields. FEWS NET also expects reduced planting to lower the income poor households earn from farm labour (FEWS NET, 2026).
• Changes in crop choices: when fertilizer is scarce and expensive, some farmers may plant less hybrid maize, which needs a lot of fertilizer, and more crops that need little or none, such as legumes, cassava and sweet potato. This can help soil fertility and household diets, but it may reduce the national maize supply in 2027 if it is not planned for.
• Risks of Higher Food Prices and Food Insecurity in 2027: if the 2027 harvest is smaller, maize prices could rise again from mid-2027 and undo part of this year's fall in food inflation. Rural households that buy most of their food would be affected first. In addition, the anticipated El Nino is likely increasing the food prices upward, making it unaffordable for most farming households (Pangapanga-Phiri, 2026).
7. Strategies to Manage Inflation
Immediate actions (lean season, November 2026 to March 2027)
• Support vulnerable households: scale up targeted food and cash transfers in the southern districts facing Crisis conditions. Adjust the value of cash transfers to current maize prices so that households can still buy enough food.
• Stabilize maize markets: time releases from the strategic grain reserve and ADMARC sales to reduce price spikes in deficit markets and keep cross-border maize trade open so that imports can fill local gaps.
• Secure fuel for the farming season: give priority fuel allocations to transporting fertilizer, seed and maize during planting, so that inputs reach farmers on time.
Medium-term actions
• Increase and diversify food production: expand irrigation, climate-resilient seed and better storage, and promote other staples such as cassava, sweet potato and legumes to reduce dependence on maize.
• Keep economic policy consistent: maintain a tight monetary policy until non-food inflation is clearly falling, supported by fiscal discipline and less borrowing.
• Address foreign exchange and fuel supply: diversity and grow exports for forex generation, rebuild strategic fuel reserves, and review the timing of fuel levies.
• Improve price information: other than aggregated prices, share with decision makers actual prices of key food items separately for rural and urban areas, so that policies can target the items driving inflation.
References
FEWS NET. (2026). Malawi Food Security Outlook, June 2026 – January 2027. Famine Early Warning Systems Network. fews.net
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). (2026a). IFPRI Malawi Maize Market Report, October 2026. Lilongwe: IFPRI Malawi. www.massp.ifpri.info
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). (2026b). IFPRI Malawi Maize Market Report, April 2026. Lilongwe: IFPRI Malawi. www.massp.ifpri.info
National Statistical Office (NSO). (2026). Consumer Price Indices: October 2026 – Stats Flash (with CPI data tables, October 2024 – October 2026). Zomba: NSO.
Pangapanga-Phiri, I., Ngoma, J., Namaona, E., Kakwera, M., Fiwa, L., & Chiwatakwenda, A. (2026). Ahead of the Storm: Preparing Malawi’s Economy for the 2026/27 El Niño and Macroeconomic Instability. Policy Brief. Bunda College, LUANAR.
Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM). (2026). Monetary Policy Committee Statement, October 2026. Lilongwe: RBM.
World Bank. (2026). Malawi Economic Monitor, 22nd Edition: Getting Reforms Right. Washington, DC: World Bank. worldbank.org
Please cite this brief as: PANGAPANGA-PHIRI Innocent. (2026). Beyond the Headline: Persistent Food Inflation in Rural and Urban Malawi, 2025–2026. Commentary Brief. Center for Agricultural Research and Development (CARD), Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Bunda College, Lilongwe, Malawi....